Western technology is based on radio ripples in the sea of ether, that is, Hertzian waves.
By contrast, scalar wave technology is based on non-Hertzian waves.
An ordinary electromagnetic wave consists of two scalar waves.
Scalar radar waves function markedly different from ordinary radar devices.
A signal can be injected directly into such a scalar wave, without causing any kind of ripples in the ether, this constitutes true wireless technology.
Then, the radar itself becomes a powerful weapon: once it receives a return signal from a target, a very powerful scalar wave pulse can be generated, and all the energy in that pulse can be returned to the distant target.
To understand what is going in Syria, one has to go back to Afghanistan (1979). Contrary to what has been publicized in the West, there were no significant losses due to the Stinger missile (see
http://europauniversitypress.co.uk/auth_article416.html ).
At first glance, as described by most political analysts, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan remains a deeply puzzling event.
Most importantly, the external threat to Afghanistan was much exaggerated by the Soviets to justify their action. Prior to the invasion, the mujahidin was weak, divided, and in no position to seize control of the country, let alone expand its activities to the Soviet Central Asian republics. The suggestion that Amin was on the verge of reorienting his country towards the West is also found to be without foundation. The action is also shown to have possessed little immediately understandable logic in the context of Moscow's dealings with the Afghan regime, while simultaneously presenting several predictable costs to both the Soviet Union's international standing and domestic affairs. Even more interesting is the finding from archival research that earlier in 1979 the CPSU Politburo had, in no uncertain terms, dismissed the option of a major deployment of Soviet troops to Afghanistan, having shown themselves to be very much alive to the high risks involved. There can be little doubt therefore that the Soviet decision to launch the invasion must be considered an extraordinary undertaking and an event meriting close study.Since the Second World War, Soviet economic penetration of Afghanistan had grown steadily. Moscow had taken the leading role in developing the country's physical infrastructure, building up its mining industry, gas pipelines, airfields, and road network, including the Salang Tunnel through the Hindu Kush, which served as the main artery connecting Afghanistan to the Soviet Union. In total, the Soviets had already completed 71 separate projects in Afghanistan by April 1978 and another 60 had been agreed upon; Soviet-Afghan trade had come to account for 70–80 percent of the Afghan total. As Milan Hauner summarizes: “Taken together, the Soviet aid program was a carefully calibrated Soviet economic penetration of a neighboring country: long before they sent a single soldier across the Afghan border, the Soviet presence in the country was already overpowering”.Had the Soviet Union proceeded more cautiously and not subverted what had been a highly favorable situation for them, Moscow would almost certainly have retained a leading role in Afghanistan and, via its economic and personnel investments, continued to have exerted considerable influence over any regime in Kabul.
However, instead of proceeding with its established policy of gradual integration and prudent maintenance of good relations with all Kabul regimes, Moscow adopted a bold and incredibly costly change in strategy, risking all of their slowly accumulated gains for an ally of seemingly little value. To look at it another way, having carefully consumed a sizeable piece of the Afghan cake, the Soviets attempted to gulp down the rest in a single, overzealous bite.Why, then, would the Soviets proceed in such a reckless manner?
Yuriy Andropov, head of the New Kremlin:
Would our forces really help them here? In this case, tanks and armored vehicles cannot be of assistance. I think that we should say directly to Comrade Taraki that we support all of their actions and will render the help which we have agreed today and yesterday, but in no way can we move to an introduction of forces to Afghanistan. […] To bring in troops, this means to fight against the people, to suppress the people, to shoot the people. We will look like aggressors, and we cannot allow this (Ob obostrenii, Bukovsky Archive, March 17–19, 1979, p. 16, p. 24).
On the basis of the factors discussed above, the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan seems bewildering. In addition to being atypical of Moscow's established Third World policy and offering few apparent benefits and several obvious costs, the deployment of troops has been shown to have been firmly and repeatedly opposed by the Politburo just a matter of months earlier. One is therefore left to ponder, what could possibly have induced the Soviet leaders to perform so rapid a volte-face? The answer to this question, then, makes it possible to understand what is going on in the Middle East today.