It's only problematic to the desperate anti-trump leftists and liberal media hype meisters. The average people see through this.
i like to think that I'm not that far from "average people" as well as a military veteran and I find this level of incompetence at the very top of the military command to be very problematic. And so should anyone who thinks that keeping sensitive information out of the hands of people not authorized to have it is a good idea.
Part of the job of the Secretary of Defense is to tell us sensitive information though. He is a communicator of sensitive information. How many times have we heard over the years things like "We are sending another x thousand troops to the frontline". Maybe you could not communicate things like this when you were in the military, but the Secretary of Defense can.
We are talking about the nuance of what he can and can't say publicly or on unclassified networks, which goes beyond the well known rules for a soldier. You guys are applying the wrong rules to the wrong person. The SecDef has extra responsibility and classification powers for his special role. Whether he is giving out sensitive information to the public, or to VIPs, he has additional freedom and responsibility of disclosure. The partial operational activities he provided were not necessarily "obviously classified" or improper to communicate to anyone.
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press-releases/chairman-wicker-ranking-member-reed-request-inspector-general-probe-into-signal-incident
The head of the Senate arms committee seems to think this requires investigation. And he's a republican.
Your source is merely admitting that he doesn't know about classification rules. He is asking for:
This chat was alleged to have included classified information pertaining to sensitive military actions in Yemen. If true, this reporting raises questions as to the use of unclassified networks to discuss sensitive and classified information, as well as the sharing of such information with those who do not have proper clearance and need to know.
Accordingly, we ask that you conduct an inquiry into, and provide us with an assessment of, the following:
1. The facts and circumstances surrounding the above referenced Signal chat incident, including an accounting of what was communicated and any remedial actions taken as a result;
2. Department of Defense (DOD) policies and adherence to policies relating to government officers and employees sharing sensitive and classified information on non-government networks and electronic applications;
3. An assessment of DOD classification and declassification policies and processes and whether these policies and processes were adhered to;
He is not calling it classified. He is asking if it is. If he has to ask, then he doesn't know. My own interpretation is that he does know, and is playing dumb to get this in writing from the Inspector General and clear the name of Pete Hegseth and set the record straight for those ignorant of classification rules.
I already know the rules, and they aren't difficult to look up. See the bolded in the following from the Department of Defense Handbook for Writing Security Classification Guidance:
https://sgp.fas.org/library/quist2/app_c.htmlThe Department of Defense (DoD) provides guidance in classifying military operations information. The following information is taken from DoD's Department of Defense Handbook for Writing Security Classification Guidance. 5
While there are no hard and fast rules for classification of military operations information, and while each Military Service and command may require a unique approach to operations security (OPSEC), there are basic concepts which can be applied. What must be protected are operational concepts and their applications, and the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and weaknesses of the plan. The element of surprise is essential to military effectiveness in both tactical and strategic operations, and requires the continuous concealment of capabilities and intentions. OPSEC is the principal means of achieving that concealment.*, 6
* Operations security is the "process of denying adversaries information about friendly capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with planning and conducting military operations and other activities" [U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Handbook for Writing Security Classification Guidance, DoD 5200.1-H, U.S. 5-3(d), March 1986].
Military operations information is defined for the purpose of this Handbook as information pertaining to a strategic or tactical military action, including training, movement of troops and equipment, supplies, and other information vital to the success of any battle or campaign. 7
Successful battle operations depend largely upon our ability to assess correctly the capability and intention of enemy forces at each stage of the battle and to communicate an effective battle doctrine throughout our forces. [To this might be added "and to keep the enemy from knowing, in advance, our capabilities and intentions during the battle."] Classifiable information would include:
a. The number, type, location, and strengths of opposing units.
b. The capabilities and vulnerabilities of weapons in enemy hands, and how he normally applies the weapon.
c. The morale and physical condition of the enemy force.8
Information related to operational plans (whether executed or not, presented in whole or in part) that if disclosed could be expected to cause damage to the United States, must be protected.8
In considering classification guidance for operations, there may be good reason to classify more information about the operation in the beginning than will be necessary later. Certain elements of information such as troop movements may no longer require protection after a certain date or event. When this point is reached, downgrading or even declassification should be considered.8
A classification guide should clearly identify the elements of information pertaining to the operational plan for which classification guidance is required. Classification shall continue only so long as unauthorized disclosure would result in damage to the national security, which may be an indefinite period of time in the case of unexecuted long range plans.9
Example items to be considered for classification include the following:10
- overall operational plans;
- system operational deployment or employment;
- initial operational capability date;
- planned location of operational units;
- equipage dates, readiness dates, and operational employment dates;
- total personnel requirements for total operational force;
- coordinates of selected operational sites;
- specific operational performance data that relate to the effectiveness of the control of forces and data on specific vulnerabilities and weaknesses;
- existing operational security and communications security procedures, projections, and techniques; and
- target characteristics.
From the bolded above we learn:
1. There are no hard rules for classification. It is essentially an opinionated matter, presumably for someone with classification powers
2. The only must there is that it must not be "expected" to cause harm to the United States. The word expected makes this another opinionated matter. The SecDef stated that the he did not expect the limited information he provided to cause harm.
3. There are various items we can "consider" for classification, meaning that not all elements are automatically classified
Those are the rules. They are not difficult to find. This is going to be a nothingburger for the Secretary of Defense. I don't know why you guys are pretending that the rules are only available in the heads of the likes of honk or garygreen for random accusations against high ranking officials, because they are clearly available for us.