This is an uncharacteristically pro-capitalist take from you, gary.
i'm simply describing a cause-and-effect relationship measured by economists, but okay.
The purpose of tariffs is not to "spur growth".
i said spur growth and protect jobs, and i obviously mean with respect to the protected industries. and the 2018 tariffs absolutely were mapped to specific domestic production/employment growth goals.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3055-1.html
hey, thanks! i didn't expect you to do any research for me, but this is a great source for me to add.
We found that U.S. economic policies achieved limited progress in promoting fair trade but a higher degree of success in defending U.S. economic-related interests. Increases in U.S. tariffs have succeeded in reducing imports from and curbing the bilateral trade deficit with China, developments that both the Trump and Biden administrations view as resulting in fairer trade. However, U.S. policies have made little progress in ensuring fair treatment for U.S. firms in China and even less in persuading the Chinese government to reduce its subsi- dies and other uncompetitive state assistance to its own manufacturers, especially exporters. The United States has experienced a higher degree of success in diversifying some supply chains away from China and constraining Chinese efforts to secure sensitive technologies that could be used for commercial or military purposes. Some of these economic policies, most notably tariff increases, have come at a price, such as reduced U.S. economic growth and losses in U.S. manufacturing jobs, output, and exports.
they go on to characterize the costs:
Several studies have attempted to quantify the economic costs of the tariffs to the U.S. econ- omy. According to the IMF estimates discussed previously, the estimated cost of the direct effects of the tariffs on the U.S. economy in 2019 was estimated at 0.18 percent of GDP; the cost in 2023 was projected to be 0.1 percent of GDP on an ongoing basis. Dollar costs would have been $39 billion and $27 billion for 2019 and 2023, respectively. 21 Bekkers and Schroeter estimated the direct cost to the U.S. economy at 0.16 percent of GDP in 2019 and projected that this loss would continue. Using this estimate, the costs to the United States would have been $34 billion in 2019 and $44 billion in 2023. 22
Mary Amiti and her coauthors found that the increases in tariffs reduced U.S. aggregate welfare by $1.4 billion per month by December 2018—$8.2 billion in total in 2018 as tar- iffs were repeatedly raised. They estimated the ongoing loss in U.S. welfare at $16.8 billion per year, 23 which translates to 0.08 percent of 2019 GDP, because of the deadweight losses from the tariffs on the U.S. economy. 24 The Congressional Budget Office concluded that the increases in tariffs would reduce U.S. GDP by 0.5 percent in 2020 ($107 billion) and reduce average real household income by $1,277 (in 2019 dollars) in 2020. 25
Consistent with international trade theory and numerous studies on the economic effects of tariffs, Aaron Flaaen and Justin Pierce found that the increases in U.S. tariffs resulted in a reduction in U.S. manufacturing output, exports, and employment. 26 They estimated that U.S. manufacturers that were highly exposed to the tariffs experienced a 1.4 percent reduc- tion in employment because of the higher costs of imported inputs and the effects of retalia- tory tariffs on their exports. These losses were only partially offset by a 0.3 percent increase in manufacturing employment in the industries that the tariffs were designed to protect. 27 To illustrate the consequences of the tariffs: U.S. firms that use an input imported from China must pay the additional costs of the tariffs. This puts them at a cost disadvantage against Canadian firms that use the same input to manufacture the same product. Both sell into the North American free trade area, but the U.S. firm has to absorb the cost of the tariff on the input imported from China, while the Canadian firm does not. The declines in exports, output, and employment found by Flaaen and Pierce reflect these outcomes.
Amiti and her coauthors found that the tariffs resulted in a 1 percentage point increase in U.S. producer prices. The average rate of producer price inflation between 1990 and 2018 was just over two percentage points, so the tariffs increased the rate of producer price inflation by almost 50 percent. 28 Companies that experienced a sharp increase in tariffs on imports of inputs increased factory-gate prices by 4.1 percent. 29
The economic literature on the 2018–2019 tariff increases finds that the entire cost of the tariffs has been passed through to U.S. consumers and businesses. 30 A complete pass-through of tariffs to an importing nation that is a major consumer of the products, such as the United States, is unusual. In this case, the complete pass-through is even more unusual, as Chinese exporters benefited from the depreciation of the renminbi in 2019, 2020, and 2023 compared with its rate in 2017. Studies generally find that when important import markets face abrupt increases in prices because of higher tariffs or shifts in exchange rates, exporters to the coun- try must reduce prices to keep market share. In these instances, the cost of the tariff is shared between the importing country and the exporting country. However, there was no notice- able decrease in the price of exports from China following the tariff increases in 2018 and 2019. Lower-income groups disproportionately bore these price increases because they spend a larger share of their income on goods imported from China, such as clothing and shoes, compared with middle- and upper-income groups. 31
In short, the increases in U.S. tariffs in 2018 resulted in reductions in U.S. manufacturing exports, output, and employment; accelerated producer and consumer price inflation; and diminished household welfare, especially for lower-income households.
in other words -- tariffs reduce domestic production and manufacturing (among many other things).
and yes, they do say that tariffs have achieved some successes. just not for any of the reasons you've been arguing. they explicitly say that tariffs have failed to change china's trade practices, and they conclude that the benefit of tariffs for access to steel is by diversifying the supply chain globally, and they see the declining trade deficit with china as a positive indication of that. lol they're not saying anywhere that tariffs are "keep a foreign adversary from killing vital industries in your nation" or anything of the sort.
Biden and Trump's administration, as well as the EU, don't really differ much in terms of economic decision making with respect to China.
yes, that's what i said.
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