So, I won't dispute the fact that North Korea could be lying, given their clear precedent, but let's assume for a moment that that's not the case. Why do we need to "get" something in return for peace? Why is giving peace and prosperity a shot such a bad thing?
whether or not this piece of paper counts as peace and/or denuclearization is the essence of my argument. i mean, sure, if i assume i'm wrong, then i'm not right. but my argument is about the assumption you're making. i don't think it's reasonable or realistic at all.
fwiw: 1) we don't need to get anything in return for peace; peace is the thing we're trying to get. 2) giving peace and prosperity a shot is always excellent; but, not every shot is equally excellent. this was an especially bad one.
what do we have to lose?
in the worst case: we legitimate and embolden the kim regime in the international community, permanently fail to denuclearize the peninsula, and give up any leverage we have over the military situation there. in the case of this particular summit, we achieved the first bit.
North Korea’s most urgent priorities were to loosen the stranglehold of sanctions and to reduce the risk of a U.S. preventive attack or a “bloody nose” strike, all without being forced to relinquish the “treasured sword,” as Kim described them, of its nuclear weapons. Other priorities included using the lure of a peace treaty to undercut U.S.–South Korean military exercises and deployments, eroding the North’s isolation and pariah status, and obtaining economic assistance and investment on terms consistent with regime control and stability. Pyongyang also hoped to alleviate the pressure on the nuclear issue and criticism of its human rights record by finding ways to fracture the solidarity among the five main players: China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. Kim sought to play them off against one another and strengthen the “accommodationist” camp in South Korea, which sees the South's alliance with the United States as an impediment to inter-Korean rapprochement.
By these measures, the Singapore summit has capped an astonishingly successful spring for Kim.
[...]
These outcomes, which have both practical and propaganda value, seem certain to strengthen Kim’s domestic standing and authority. Most important, the warm reception from the president of the United States has helped Kim normalize, if not legitimize, North Korea's status as a nuclear weapons state. Kim is not interested in the Libyan model; he’s interested in the Pakistani model.